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H
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIElD (D ., MONTANA)
h~l

0

1963
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DEFENSE AND MR . McNAMARA

Mr. President :
For some time the Government Operations Committee has been
in~uiring

into the circumstances surrounding the award of a contract for

development of the T.F.X . plane .

What will emerge from this investigation,

what legislation will derive from it , cannot be foreseen.

It is not

my

intention to anticipate, much less to prejudge the Committee's findings.
But whatever the outcome, let there be no doubt as to the interest of
the Senate in this matter .

It is an entirely appropriate and pertinent

interest .
Public funds are spent in vast sums for military research and
development.

Together with the President, it is the Congress which pro-

vides the legal basis for the procedures under which these funds are
expended .

It is the Congress which appropriates these funds .

It is the

Congress which must answer to the people as to the general wisdom of the
appropriations .

And in part at least, the Congress must answer for the

effectiveness with which these appropriations are disbursed by the Executive Branch.

The very process of Committee inquiry, moreover, has signi-

ficant value in an educative sense .

And in the end that which may be

learned in this or any particular case could well have wider legislative
application.

In

in~uiring

deeply into the T.F.X. matter, therefore, the

Committee on Government Operations is discharging a wholly legitimate
function by authority of and on behalf of the Senate.

- 2 May I say that what has transpired to date in the investigation

has led me to take the floor today.

I do so to give voice to the views of

one Member of the Senate, a Senator from Montana.

The views are not new.

Rather, they are views which have accumulated over the years and have begun
to crystalize in the light of developments in the T.F.X. inquiry.
It is apparent from these hearings, that an immense number of
factors were involved in the T.F.X. contract award.
are of a military nature.
cations.

Some of these factors

Others are broader than military in their impli-

And many are not open or shut tangibles but, rather, involve best

judgments on the part of the men who are expected by the nature of the
responsibilities entrusted to them to make best judgments.
Since such is the case, I do not believe that it is reasonable
to expect any Senator or Committee of Senators to say with certainty that
Secretary McNamara's decision in the T.F .X. was the right one or the wrong
one.

Nor do I believe that the spokesman of any particular branch of the

Armed Services is competent to say with certainty that the Secretary's
decision was the right one or the wrong one .

Nor, in the light of the

factors involved, are all of the spokesmen of the military services combined
competent to do so .

To be sure, their professionalism gives great weight

to such objective military opinions as they may advance.

But we should not

overlook the fact that their very professionalism compels them to regard
the development of a piece of military equipment, not in the context of
total costs and national policies but largely in terms of military desirability and specific utility and, perhaps, even more pointedly, in terms of
military desirability and specific utility as seen against a background of
a particular training and service experience.

That is as it should be.

Military leaders are not required and ought not to be required to answer

- 3 the questions of the people of this nation as to the additional tax burdens
or the neglected civilian needs which any military cost may entail.
these questions must be answered by someone in this government.
they must be answered by the President and by the Congress.

But

Indeed,

And because

that is the case and must remain so under a system of free and responsible
government, it is not appropriate and it may be misleading to weigh military
observations on any weapons-system in a vacuum and to assume that decisions
arrived at on that basis are automatically the valid decisions.
Even Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, with all due respect,
cannot speak with certainty as to the correctness of his decisions in the
T.F.X. matter.

Only time, if even that, will permit a logical assessment

of his specific judgments.
The truth is that there are no certainties in matters of this
kind.
T.F.X. apart, I am inclined to think--and I reason now from
history rather than specifics--that at some future date it will be seen
in retrospect that Mr. McNamara made many correct decisions as Secretary
of Defense and occasionally that he made wrong decisions.

But for the

present, all that can be asked, all that should be asked, of any man in
his position is that, under the President, he exercise every diligence and
full dedication to his public responsibility and do his best to reach the
best decisions.
On that score, Mr. McNamara needs no defense from me or anyone
else.

His record speaks for itself.

His is, in these times, the most

difficult and the most complex assignment in the government after the
President.

His immense international responsibilities which dovetail with

those of the Secretary of State involve questions of life or death for tens
of millions in this country and elsewhere.

- 4 In addition, he has the supreme administrative responsibilities
for the Defense Establishment.

That Department now contains a million

civilian employes and more than two and a half million men and women in
uniform.
Reposed in him is the trust of dispensing public funds in excess
of' $50 billion a year, a sum equal to more than the total of all other
federal expenditures combined.
In the light of these vast responsibilities, Secretary McNamara
has been an outstanding and exceptional servant of the people of this
nation .

He was a tower of strength to the late President in carrying the

great burdens of Chief Executive .

His remaining in office at the request

of President Johnson is an assurance to the nation that we will continue
to have the highest possible degree of intelligent, experienced and dedicated
public service in this most critical Cabinet position .
Mr . McNamara was confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of Defense
to see to it that this nation has the kind of defense structure which the
President, together with the Congress, deem necessary for national security.
He was confirmed by the Senate to bring about and maintain that structure
at the lowest possible cost to the people of the United States.

That--no

more, no less-- is what the law, the Constitutional pm.,rers of the Presidency,
and the dimensions of the office of Secretary of Defense require of him.
And I should think that every Member of this body would want to consider a
long time, a very long time, before seeking to require anything else of this
Secretary of Defense or any other .

I should think, too, that we would want

to consider a long time, a very long time, before curbing or undermining
the authority of the office of the Secretary of Defense in vievr of the
critical decisions which must be made if this responsibility is to be
effectively exercised.

- 5 If the Secretary of Defense does not have the authority to make
the critical decisions where else shall it be lodged in this government?
What shall we

re~uire

of the Secretary if it is not the critical decisions?

That he serve as a kind of coach or water- boy or, perhaps, a chaplain for
the military services?

That the final decisions , not merely those of t he

battlefield but of defense management and technology in effect , shall be
made by military personnel?

If I may be blunt, Mr . President , it would

appear, in that concept , that the Secretary ' s principal functions woul d be
reduced to fighting for the Defense Establishment's share of the total
national budgetary pie and then to

l~eeping

to blows over how it is to be divided .

the various services from com)_ng

If I may be blunt, in prior years

we have had our experience with that kind of an approach.
Indeed, the Secretary of Defense is a sort of umpire .

But the

fact is that the present Secretary of Defense is an umpire who has sought
increasingly to establish service- needs and expenditures on the basis of
the

re~uirements

of total national policies and in response to the admoni -

tions of the Congr : ss for economic and efficient operation of the Defense
Establishment .

He is an umpire v7ho has exercised the authority of his

office to say, not only "yes," but "no, " when necessary, and to make the
"no" stick ,

He has exercised the power to say "no," increasingly, to curb

that notorious invitation to waste and extravagence, the cost- plus contract .
He has exercised the power to say "no" to budgetary
services which often and understandably are

re~uests

from the various

heavily influenced by a one-

service rather than an all- service concept of national defense .

He has

exercised the power to say "no" to separate service purchase of common use
items of

e~uipment

and supply .

And the Congress knows that this type of

purchasing did much to bring about the stockpiling of military surpluses,

- 6 surpluses whose costs dwarf even those engendered in agriculture.

He has

exercised the power to say "no" to certain new weapons developments.

However,

any such development may intrigue its advocates, from the national point of
view it ought not to be pursued unless it contains sufficient promise end
can otherwise justify itself on the basis of cost-to-potential contribution
to total defense.

And lest there be any doubt of the need of such curbs,

I shall read to the Senate a list of projects and their cost to the public-projects which over the past ten years did indeed intrigue their advocates
but which were abandoned before completion or declared obsolete or surplus
soon efter completion.

S .E E

L I

S T

- 7 The total cost of these abandoned projects in the past ten years
is over $5 billion.

To be sure, some value, some experience, may well have

been obtained from each of them.

But let there be no mistake about it.

Taken together they are indicative, to say the least, of an immense and
conspicuous consumption of the nation's supply of talent and facilities for
research and development.

For this technological high-living, it is the

people of the United States vTho must pick up the check in actual military
costs and in the incalculable

costs of a distorted usage of scarce

scientific and technological resources.
Taken together these abandoned projects have represented, too, a
major factor in running up the accumulation of surplus and obsolescent
property by the armed services.

For years in the past the total of such

property disposed of at a fraction of cost has fluctuated between
and $8 billion annually.

$4 billion

To put this figure . ·in some kind of perspective,

consider that it means that every year our military establishment got rid
of, at a fraction of cost, assets with a value anywhere from about equivalent
to, to double the amount that the United Kingdom expends
services for all purposes.

on~

its armed

In short, the British have been running their

Army, Navy and Air Forces year in and year out for something less than the
cost to us of our annual losses through excess military accumulations or
obsolescence.
Mr. President, the Secretary of Defense, has, indeed, said "no"
with frequency during the three years in which he has been in office.

Yet

there is nothing to suggest that because he has done so our defense position
in the world is any less effective, any less impressive than heretofore.
On the contrary, such indications as there are suggest that the Defense
Establishment is bett·e r prepared and more capable of meeting a wider
range of possible military challenges to this nation.

- 8 There is a good deal of talk about the high cost of government
and the need to cut expenditures.

In the light of this talk, I cannot

imagine that anyone in the Senate would wish to undermine the Secretary's
authority to say "no" to the ever-present and immense bureaucratic pressures
for expenditures within

~he

Defense Establishment.

away at almost any item in the budget.

To be sure we can chop

The Department of State, for

example, had a budget request for $374 million this year and a show of
economy can be made by reducing it and closing a fevl consulates abroad in
the process.

But we are deluding ourselves if we believe for one moment

that it will be possible to curb the growth in the cost of the federal
government, let alone reduce that cost significantly unless someone has
the authority, under the President, to act decisively in connection with
defense expenditures.

For that is where the great expenditures are.

In

the 1964 budget, for example, $53.7 billion was proposed by the President
for the Defense Establishment.

The next allocation in size in that budget

was $11.3 billion for Treasury, and of this total $10.2 billion represents
an allocation for interest on the public debt.
I ask the Senate to note, further, that the figure of $53.7
billion in new obligational authority for the Defense Department represented
the final figure proposed in the budget submitted to Congress early this
year.

But before it was arrived at, Secretary McNamara had pared down

reguests from all of the individual military services under his supervision.
When these individual requests initially reached his desk they totaled the
great sum of $67 billion.

In other ·1-1ords, Mr. President, the services,

left to their ovm individual devices, would have sought of the Congress

$13.3 billion more than the Secretary of Defense, in the end, allowed them
to ask.

And yet in spite of this enormous cut, the $53 .7 bj.llion requested

for the armed services for fiscal year 1964 was still a record high.

- 9 Uith all due respect, would the President have been in a position
to direct, except arbitrarily, a cut of $13.3 billion in the combined requests of the various services7

With all due respect, would this body or

even its exceptionally capable Armed Services Committee have been able to
say "no", with any degree of confidence, to the tune of a reduction of
$13-3 billion7

Hould the equivalent body in the House7

With all due

respect, I t hink the Congress would have had great difficulty in knowing
where to enter the jungle of Defense finance and I doubt that we would have
gone much beyond the fringes for fear of jeopardizing the necessary defense
of the nation.
And, so, Mr. President, we are back to a Secretary of Defense
with authority.

If we did not have one he would have to be invented.

I am persuaded that we have in office an exceptional Secretary
of Defense who is attempting to meet the full responsibilities of that
office.

I believe that he is exercising with great determination, intel-

ligence and knowledge the authority which must go with those responsibilities.
It would seem to me that we ought to do whatever we are able to
do to help him in his responsibilities.

For we are all in agreement that

we are seriously challenged by Communist power from abroad in a military
sense as well as in other ways.

We are all in agreement that against the

military challenge there must be posed the necessary military defense for
the security of the nation, at whatever the cost.
But the extent of the challenge from abroad is a variable depending upon changes in the world situation.

The phrase "necessary military

defense 11 is a variable, subject in interpretation to infinite extension.
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And the phrase "at vhatever the cost" is a blank cheque which if taken in
a literal sense, can be drawn, in the end, upon the total resources of the
people of the United States.

These are realities, Mr. President, whLch are just beginning to
dawn upon us.

These are realities with which, I believe, the present

Secretary of Defense is seeking to grapple.

These are realities to which,

as legislators, we must turn our attention.

It seems to me that we must

begin to think deeply as to how the dimensions of "necessary military defense" may be drawn and redrawn more accurately in the light of an everchanging international situation.

And we must ask ourselves, too, how

are we to keep "whatever the cost" of that necessary defense at a rational
level in order that, in the end, it does not overwhelm the nation.
These are not empty questions nor are they theoretical questions.
"Necessary defense" has been defined and redefined consistently over the
past decade as more and more.

trHhatever the cost" has risen from $37.8

billion in fiscal 1954 to the $53·7 billion which was requested for fiscal

1964. And the latter figure, as already noted, was presented to the Congress after the Secretary of Defense had reduced

~·;;;

the initial service

requests of $67 billion by $13·3 billion.
May I say that it is understandable if, in defining the dimensions of necessary military defense, those who have direct military responsibility are inclined to leave a margin for safety.

That is appropriate;

it is proper; it is to be commended rather than criticized.

After all,

those who have these responsibilities are grappling in an area which is
both inexact and ever-changing and one which is not subject, in the end,
to computer-calculation.
I, for one, do not begrudge the cost of a margin for extra
safety--a substantial margin--and I believe the people of the nation
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are similarly inclined.

But the problem still remains .

We must be ever-

mindful lest in determining what is necessary for military defense we become so obsessed with the extra margin for safety that it grows into a
fear-fed monster which, in the end, devours that ''hich it is designed to
safeguard.
In the same fashion, our willingness to pay "whatever the cost"
of necessary defense must not be an invitation to acquiesce in administrative procedures within the defense establishment which tend toward wasteful rather than prudent expenditures.

And I would emphasize that in this

area--in the area of management procedures--there is no excuse for an excessive margin of safety.

Expenditures for the management of the defense

establishment, unlike the determination of over- all defense needs, can be
subject to reasonably exact control by computer-calculation, by accounting
procedures and by the many other tools of modern American business management.
If I may sum up, Mr . President, two questions ought to be everpresent in our minds in considering any problem of defense :
1.

How are vTe to insure that this government defines and re-

defines "necessary military defense" with full adequacy but without fantastic and obsessive excess, in a world situation in which "necessary
defense" is an ever-changing but not necessarily an ever-increasing
quantity?
2.

How are we to design the procedures within this government

and within the Defense establishment so that they will provide this fully
adequate necessary defense at the least cost to the people of the nation
who, in the end, must pay for it?

- 12 -

There is no formula by which these questions may be ansvered.
For years, we have been ordering and re-ordering the processes of the
Executive Branch, in order that that branch may define

mo~e

accurately

for the President the nature of tlle international dangers 'llhich conf'ront
us.

For years we have been

orde~ing

and re-ordering the structure of t he

Defense Department, in an effort to limit

expendi~~es

to the necessary.

Yet year after year the problem has loomed largere
If there is not an easy

formula~

there are certain negatives

which might be examined for the light that they shed on what may stimulate
defense costs far beyond the necessary.

These are the things, it seems to

me, we must not do, if we mean to keep a rational perspective on the
realities which face us in the world and, in the light of them 3 hold expenditures for defense at a rational level consistent with national security.
These negatives, these tentative observations 1 I should like to leave with
the Senate in concluding my remarks.
In defining and redefining the dimensions of "what is necessary"
for defense, we are likely to leave a most vrasteful, rather. than a desirable margin for safety unless these realities are recognized anevr:
1.

That, under our system of government1 there can be no

substitute for the preRonderant judgments of the President as to the total
and the ever-changing challenge from abroad to this nation.

These judg-

ments must provide the key for determining the essential dimensions of
vrhat is militarily necessary for the security of the nation.
2~

That, in making his judgments, the President must neces-

sarily depend on advice and counsel from whatever sources he deems appropriate--military and civilian--but once his judgments are made, it is inappropriate for any permanent official of the Executive Branch--military
or civilian--to do other than his best to carry them into effect.

- 13 -

3· That the President's judgments--once made--in this
connection are subject to challenge not by permanent officials of the
Executive Branch--military or civiH.an--but only by the Congress, acting
as the Constitution makes clear that it can and shall act, by legislative
initiative and by legislative oversight.

4. That, under the President and the laws of the land, the
Secretary of Defense has the authority to establish--with the help of the
Joint Chiefs--the strategic concepts which shall set for all the armed
services, their appropriate roles in maintaining the kind of defense which
the President and the Congress have deemed necessary for the nation's
security; and, further, that within the Defense Establishment, the Secretary
of Defense has authority to control administrative procedures and practices
for efficient and effective operations.
And if I may continue with the negatives, Mro President, I should
like also to stress that we are not going to get an effective and efficient
defense at a tolerable cost unless it is recognized in all frankness:
lo

That the Defense Establishment, as the largest single

purchaser of goods and services in the nation, has come to occupy a substantial position in the civilian economy of this nation; that, in this connection1 what the Defense Department does or does not do has come to have great
importance not only for defense but for the well-being of business, labor
and whole communities scattered throughout the nationo
2.

That, in the light of this economic position which the

Defense Establishment occupies it would be a gross naivete to assume that
pressures--increasing pressures--will not be present for decisions to be
made by the Defense Department not solely on considerations of necessary,
effective and efficient defense--and may I say that

collo~uies

on the floor

between Senators from various of the larger states underscore this point.

- 14 -

3. That however understandable these pressu·es may be--and
as a Senator from Montana I hope that I try to do as much for

~Y

stat2

~~

any other Member--the nation will be ill-served if there is not lTithin this
government those attitudes and those conditions for administration of the
affairs of the Defense Establishment which

pe~mit

the decisions, i n the

end, to be made on the basis of necessary, effective

an~

eff icient defense.

Mr. President, in making these remarks today, I have not been
unaware of the eloquent farewell address of the former President, Mr.
Eisenhower, in which he warned of the need to guard against the development
of an industrial-military complex of power in the nation.

Nor have I been

unmindful of dangers to that classic doctrine of freedom--the doctrine of
civilian supremacy.
And yet, with all due respect, I do not see the principal diff1=
culty which confronts us in these contexts.

If there were ever to be an

imminent danger to freedom in this nation of the kind alluded to by Mr.
Eisenhower, it is not likely to be the cause of the failure of popularly
responsible government.

Rather it is likely to be the consequence of the

failure of civilian responsibility in the Congress no less than in the
Executive Branch of the government.

And I want to say to the Senate, that

this system of freedom which we know will not fail.

It will not fail so

long as an excessive fear does not drive us to an obsessive interpretation
of what is necessary for defense.

It will not fail if we are prepared to

face the economic and social difficulties which confront the nation and
deal with them on their own merits--their civilian merits--rather than to
seek to evade them, or to act on them haphazardly and inadequately and
ineffectively because we find it easier to act under the camouflage of an
inflated concept of military necessity .

- 15 These, then, Mr. President, are some of the observations which
I have to make.

They are observations stimulated by the work of the

T.F.X. inquiry which is being conducted by the very able Senator from
Arkansas (Mr. McClellan) and his distinguished colleagues on the Government
Operations Committee.

They are observations growing out of a very high

respect for the patriotic dedication and the ability with which Mr. McNamara
is seeking to serve the nation under the President.
It is incumbent upon all of us, it seems to me, not to ignore
these larger implications of the T.F.X. matter.

It is incumbent upon us--

the President, the Congress, the press and the people of the United States-to face them, to discuss them, and, as necesaary, to act on them within the
Constitution.

Department of the Army
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

Prjme
Contractor .; (s)

MISS1IES
DART

1958

44.0

Aerophysics Corp.

A wire-guided surface-to-surface antitank missile with a range
of approximately 6,000 yards. This missile system was cancelled
since the French designed SS-10 proved to be more effective in this
role.
ORDNANCE, COMBAT VEHIClES .AND RElATED EQUIFMENT
Sperry Gyroscope

VIGILANTE

A 6-barrel, 37mm automatic anti-aircraft gun system mounted on a
full-track vehicle chassis and complete with radar fire control.
This gun system was cancelled since the MAULER surface-to-air
missile system has been designed and should be more effective in
the anti-aircraft role intended.
OTHER EQUIPMENT

AN/USD 4 Drone

Republic Aviation

1960

A medium endurance survelliance drone, capable of carrying a
450 lb o pay-load for 55 minutes duration. This drone program
was cancelled since it was considered that the AN/USD-5, when
developed, could perform this mission as well.
AN/USD 5 Drone

103-3

Fairchild Astro
Corporation

A long-endurance surve:iJ.J.ance drone, capable of carrying a 450 lb.
pay-load for 90 minutes duration. This drone program was cancelled
since cost effectiveness studies have indicated that the Air Force
with their F4c and RF-101 modernization program can perform the
mission more effectively.

Department of the Navy
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title

Year Cancelled

Prime
Contractor(s)

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

AIRCRAFT:

SEAMASTER

Martin Co~
Marlen Const o Co.

1959

Jet powered mine laying seaplaneo Specialized for low
altitude attack against submarine pens., Cancelled because of
technical problems, high cost and slippage in programo
MISSilES:
REGULUS II

1958

144.4

Ling Tempco
L.F. Stillwell
& Co.

Surface-to-surface missile with 500 nautical mile range
and weight of ll,570 lb. eq_uipped wit-h Shoran grid guidance.
Cancelled because it became redundant vrhen better systems vrere
aEsured before its completion.
PETREL

1957

Fairchild A/C

Air-to-surface missile with 20 nautical mile range and
weight of 3300 lbs. equipped with active radar homing plus
acoustic torpedoo Cancelled for consideration of reasons
including state-of-the-art advances, changing military requirements and cost considerations.

CORVUS

1960

Ling Tempco

Air-to-surface missile with 170 nautical mile range and
weight of 1750 lbs. equipped with passive or semi-act:i.ve radar
homing. Cancelled for consideration of reasons including stateof-the-art advances, changing military requirements, cost considerations, plus contractor difficulties.
EAGlE

1961

Bendix Aviation

Air-to-air missile with 70 nautical mile range and weight
of 1400 lbs. equipped with midcourse command plus active radar
homing. Since this was the missile system for the Missileer
aircraft, it was cancelled ,,.,hen Missileer was dropped.

Department of the Navy
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Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

Prime
Contractor(s)

MISSilES:
METEOR

M. I. T.

Air-to-air missile with 10 nautical mile range and weight
of 510 lbs. and semi-active homing. Cancelled in weeding out
of early air-to-air missile projects in favor of more promising
air-to-air projects.
RIGEL

1953

Grumman A/C

Surface-to-surface missile with 4oo nautical mile range
and weight of 19,000 lbs. equipped with ramjet, command midcourse, plus radar homing. Cancelled for same weeding out
process as METEOR above, plus it was a competitor to REGULUS.
DOVE

1955

33·7

Eastman Kodak
Co~

Air-to-surface missile with gravity bomb and weight of 1300 lbs.
equipped with infrared homing. Cancelled because of changing requirements plus technical difficulties.
SHIPS:

Submarine Underwater
Propulsion Systems

1954

General Electric
Allis-Chalmers
Elliott Company
Westinghouse
Elec.

Work began in 1945 and continued to 1954 on closed and semiclosed propulsion cycles, all of which could be used to propel
submarines in fully submerged conditions. Cancelled because of
the success of nuclear propulsion.

Department of the Navy
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Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

Prime
Contractor( s)

OTHER:
NRRS, Sugar Grove

1962

70.0

Tidewater Constr~ Co.
Patterson-Emerson
Constr.

A 6oo'dia.meter, rotatable radio antennae device to
provide an improved capability in spece research and intelligence gathering activities. Cancelled because costs
increased from initial estimate of less than $8o million
to over $190 million and, during the period when the structural design phase of the antennae was in progress, other
scientific techniques capable of performing the antennae
functions were perfected.
ZIP Fuel

1959

Callery Chem. Coo

Fuel of 50% higher energy than jet fuel, for use in
gas turbines. Cancelled because of high cost and technical
difficulties.

Department of the Air Force
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

Prime
Contractor( s)

AIRCRAFT:
511.6**

A11P

Boeing/Gen. Dyna.
GE/PP.:.W

This was a program to develop a nuclear-powered long-range,
long endurance aircraft for possible strategic application. The
program was cancelled because it had inadequate military potential
in any form which was technically feasible.
F-108

North American

1959

This program was for development of a long-range ( 1000 mile)
supersonic manned interceptor, equipped with a highly sophisticated
fire control system, to counter the airborne bomber threat of the
1960's and 1970's. The overall program was cancelled because of
the relative decrease of the manned bomber threat.
XF-103

1957

10~.0

Republic

This was an advanced fighter concept for a titanium mach
3.0 fighter, powered by a dual cycle (turbojet/ramjet) propulsion
system. It 'Was cancelled primarily as a result of technical
problems (e.g. poor visibility, J -67 engine problems) rising costs,
and greater promise of the F-108 program (e.g. long range).
F-107

1957

100.0

North American

This was a fighter-bomber development program in competition
with the F-105. It was cancelled in favor of the latter, which
proved to be a superior weapon system.
J -83 Engines

1959

55o0

Fairchild

This was a small lightweight turbojet engine in the 2000 lb.
thrust range, for pos~ible missile or aircraft application. It
was cancelled in favor of a competitively superior engine.

*
if*

Tentative; pending termination proceedings.
AF costs only.
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AIRCRAFT:
C-132

Douglas

1957

This was a turboprop heavy long-range transport designed to
carry 100 1 000 lb. payload. It was cancelled because of potential
high cost and because the C-133, although not capable of as hi&~
a payload, appeared sufficiently versatile to meet Air Force needs.
T-61 Engine

Allison

1959

This was an internal combustion burboprop engine of advanced
designc Cancellation was based on the fact that the engine had not
been designated for application to any specific future weapon system.
H-16

Vertol

1954

This was an extremely large fuselage, twin-rotor, high capacity
helicopter. Hampered by technical problems, delays and cost overrun, it was cancelled as a result of reappraisal following the crash
of an experimental model.
MISSilES:

NAVAHO

North American

1957

This was a supersonic surfa ce-to-surface intercontinental
strategic missile. It was cancelled in its flight test phase,
having been overtaken by t he a ccelerated ICBM development program.
677.4

SNARK

Northrop

This was a subsonic surface-to- surface intercontinental
strategic missileo Although completely developed and placed in
the active inventory, it was rendered quickly obsolete by the
accelerated ICBM program.

GAM-6 3 RASCAL

1958

448.0

Bell

This was an air-launched air-to-surface missile for use by
strategic forces (B-47)• The program was cancelled in favor of
the inherently superior Hound Dog.
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MISSilES:
Douglas

G.AM-87 Skybolt

This was a ballistic missile to be air launched from the B-52
or British Vulcan bombers. Cost escalation, time delay, revised
estimates of actual performanace, and availability of other ways to
do the job better on a cost-effectiveness basis caused cancellation.
TALOS (Land Based)

1957

ll8.1

Bendix

This was a land-based surface-to-air missile for the air defense
missione Air Force effort terminated when short range surface-to-air
missiles were designated as an Army sole responsibility.
Mobile MINUTEMAN

108.4

Boeing

This program consisted of the present Minuteman surface-tosurface missile transported and fireo. from railroad cars o It was
cancelled because of high cost and little military value versus
other systems.
Q-4 DRONE

1959

84.4

Norihrop

This was a small turbojet drone to be used by Air Defense
Command for training. It was cancelled because of a lack of
funds and a change in requirements~
SM-73 GOOSE

1958

Fairchild

This was a subsonic long range decoy missile for strategic
application, to be ground launched as an electronic countermeasure
device. The program was overtaken by other developments (eog. GAM-72
Quail) and by changes in concept of operation.
GAM.-67 CROSSBOW

1956

Northrop

This program was the ori ginal air-to-surface anti-radiation
missile (.ARM). The modern version is the SHRIKE. It was cancelled
because other systems were considered more favorable and because of
uncertainties in the guidance syste~ .

Department of the Air Force

- 4 -

ProJect Title

Year Cancelled

Funds Invested
(Millions of Dollars)

Prime
Cont.ra.ctor( s)

OTHER:

AN/A.I.R-27

1959

142.0

Sperry

This program was a complete integrated electronic countermeasures system for the B-52. It was cancelled because of the
extreme cost.
Hi Energy Boron
Fuel

1959

135·8**

Olin Mathieson,
others

The program was for the development of fuel to power a
Chemically Powered Bomber. It was cancelled because it was
overtaken by other developments, because of technical problems
encountered, and because the requirement was cancelled for the
specific aircraft to which it had known application.

